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Non-technical Summary
This paper investigates the effect of mobility among a firm’s R&D personnel on
its innovation performance.
Since knowledge created within an R&D department of a firm is largely em-
bodied in the person of the individual researcher, firms might gain access to
external knowledge via hiring new staff. Consequently, innovation should be en-
hanced. However, firms may suffer from a simultaneous outflow of R&D workers.
Our empirical analysis falls back on theories developed by Jovanovic (1979)
and Cooper (2001). According to these theories, labor mobility increases the
employer-employee matching quality within the R&D department (Jovanovic,
1979). Moreover, as long as the R&D knowledge of a leaving worker can be
still used by the worker’s former employer, overall labor mobility results in net
inflows of R&D knowledge and thus should stimulate innovation (Cooper, 2001).
To disentangle the effects of net gains or losses in R&D personnel and replace-
ments within the R&D department is the major aim of this study. We employ,
besides net growth in R&D personnel, churning as a measure for R&D worker
mobility. Churning depicts the number of workers which are replaced by new
ones, i.e. it is an employment-neutral measure of labor turnover. Furthermore,
we distinguish between different types of innovations, namely between process
and product innovations as well as between market and product-range novelties.
Using two sets of bivariate probit regressions, we estimate various knowledge
production functions. Labor mobility is found to enhance innovation performance
up to a certain threshold. Interestingly, this threshold differs between the types
of innovation. The optimal amount of churning among R&D works is lower for
process innovations than for product innovations. This result is intuitive since
process innovation will require much more firm-specific knowledge and less ex-
ternal knowledge. Our regressions further indicate that a positive effect of la-
bor mobility on innovation performance depends crucially on the appropriability
regime. If R&D knowledge is characterized by rivalry in its application, i.e. it is
non-duplicative, the threshold up to which a positive effect of labor mobility can
be observed is considerably lower.
Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze
Die vorliegende Studie untersucht den Zusammenhang zwischen der Mobilita¨t
von Mitarbeitern im Bereich von Forschung und Entwicklung (FuE) und dem
Innovationserfolg deutscher Unternehmen.
Durch die Einstellung neuer FuE-Mitarbeiter ko¨nnen Firmen neues externes
Wissen akquirieren und damit ihre Chancen auf die erfolgreiche Einfu¨hrung neuer
Produkte und Produktionsprozesse erho¨hen. Umgekehrt besteht die Gefahr, dass
im Unternehmen vorhandenes Wissen verloren geht, wenn FuE-Mitarbeiter aus-
scheiden. Sofern die Unternehmen die Forschungsergebnisse ihrer Mitarbeiter je-
doch auch nach deren Ausscheiden noch anwenden ko¨nnen, sollte die Fluktuation
unter FuE-Bescha¨ftigten insgesamt zu einem Zufluss an Wissen fu¨hren und damit
Innovationen stimulieren, wie das theoretisches Modell von Cooper (2001) zeigt.
Daru¨ber hinaus ist auf Basis von Matching-Theorien (Jovanovic, 1979) zu erwar-
ten, dass ein gewisses Maß an Fluktuation dafu¨r sorgt, dass Mitarbeiter-Matches
von schlechter Qualita¨t aufgelo¨st und neue, bessere Matches eingegangen werden.
Um im Rahmen unserer Analysen den Effekt eines Nettozuwachses oder Net-
toverlusts von FuE-Mitarbeitern von dem Effekt einer Auswechslung von FuE-
Mitarbeitern auf die Innovationsta¨tigkeit von Unternehmen zu trennen, greifen
wir auf ein Maß zuru¨ck, das bisher nur in arbeitsmarkto¨konomischen Studien
verwendet wurde, das Churning von Mitarbeitern. Dieses Maß bildet die An-
zahl von Mitarbeitern ab, die durch andere, neue Mitarbeiter ersetzt wurden,
d.h. dieses Maß ist bescha¨ftigungsneutral. Weiterhin unterscheiden wir zwischen
verschiedenen Innovationsarten. Wir trennen zum einen zwischen Produkt- und
Prozessinnovationen und zum anderen zwischen Markt- und Sortimentsneuheiten.
Mit Hilfe bivariater Probitmodelle scha¨tzen wir vier Wissensproduktionsfunk-
tionen und ko¨nnen zeigen, dass fu¨r alle vier Innovationsarten ein umgekehrt u-
fo¨rmiger Verlauf zwischen der Mobilita¨t von FuE-Mitarbeitern und dem Innova-
tionserfolg besteht. Dies bedeutet, dass die Fluktuation das Innovationsergebnis
bis zu einem gewissen Schwellenwert steigert. Dieser Schwellwert variiert je nach
Art der Innovation. So dreht sich der Effekt im Falle von Prozessinnovationen
wesentlich fru¨her ins Negative (bei einer Churningrate von 30 v.H.) als im Fal-
le von Produktinnovationen (65 v.H.). Daraus la¨sst sich schlussfolgern, dass die
Entwicklung neuer Prozesse mehr firmenspezifisches Wissen erfordert als die Ent-
wicklung neuer Produkte. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen ferner, dass die Mobilita¨t von
FuE-Bescha¨ftigten insbesondere die Wahrscheinlichkeit fu¨r Produktinnovationen
erho¨ht, die eine Erweiterung ihres bisherigen Produktsortiments darstellen. Die
mit der Mobilita¨t von FuE-Mitarbeitern einhergehenden positiven Innovations-
wirkungen sind daru¨ber hinaus abha¨ngig von der Art des im Zuge der FuE-
Ta¨tigkeit geschaffenen Wissens. Besteht Rivalita¨t in der Nutzung des Wissens
verringern sich die positiven Effekte durch die Fluktuation.
2
Churning of R&D Personnel and Innovation
Kathrin Mu¨llera, ∗
Bettina Petersa,b
a Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)
b University of Zurich
This version: May, 2010
Abstract
This paper explores the role of R&D worker mobility on innovation
performance. As one main novelty, we employ churning as a measure for
worker mobility. Churning depicts the number of workers which are re-
placed by new ones. It is a very informative indicator since a firm may be
exposed to simultaneous leave and inflow of R&D workers even if the size of
R&D employment remains unchanged. Hence, we can separate the effect of
replacement from net change in R&D workforce. Our results from estimat-
ing various knowledge production functions suggest an inverse u-shaped
relationship. The exchange of R&D personnel fosters innovation through
inter-firm knowledge spillovers and improved job-match quality up to cer-
tain threshold. The point when costs of churning exceed the benefits is
reached faster if the R&D knowledge is non-duplicative.
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1 Introduction
Indisputably, knowledge has been identified as the key input for developing inno-
vations. Because of the rapidly increasing speed of technological changes and in-
creasing technological complexity of products and processes, firms have to source
outside knowledge in order to complement internal knowledge. A body of litera-
ture has thus focussed on firms’ strategies of how to gain access to new knowledge
and on the effectiveness of these strategies in terms of innovation performance.
Main routes of how firms can tap new external knowledge are cooperations and
strategic alliances with other actors (competitors, science, customers, clients),
licensing of technology, mergers and acquisitions, contract R&D, and the hiring
of new labor (see Teece, 1986, 1992; Hagedoorn, 2002; Cassiman and Veugelers,
2006).1
Several strands of the literature emphasize a stimulating effect of recruiting
new personnel on knowledge creation and innovation (Rao and Drazin, 2002).
The main argument relies on the fact that knowledge originating from R&D and
competencies are largely embodied in people. According to the resource-based
view of the firm, hiring new personnel is thus seen as an important mechanism for
acquiring skills (Barney, 1991). In addition, it is an important way of exchanging
ideas, learning from competitors, and imitating their innovations (institutional
perspective). The network theory furthermore stresses that hiring new personnel
facilitates the establishment of new connections and a professional community
(Baker, 1994).
However, it is often neglected in this literature that hiring a new worker may
be associated with the departure of previous workers. That is, we can often si-
multaneously observe hirings and separations of workers within a firm. In labor
economics, determinants of simultaneous hiring and firing and its influence on
firm performance have been investigated (see Burgess et al., 2000a; Ilmakunnas
et al., 2005). For R&D personnel, one can likewise observe simultaneous inflow
1Studies which support the complementarity between internal and external knowledge in-
clude among others Arora and Gambardella (1994) and Cassiman and Veugelers (2006). Cassi-
man and Veugelers (2007) provide evidence that different external technology sourcing strategies
are complements in large and substitutes in small firms.
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and outflow of workers. The mobility of workers among firms presents a way of
knowledge diffusion and is thus a major source of potential spillovers. As a con-
sequence, a firm may benefit from incoming spillovers and suffer from knowledge
outflows (outgoing spillovers) at the same time. Besides getting access to new
knowledge, labor reallocation may also be driven by improving the match be-
tween the skills firms demand and employees provide (Jovanovic, 1979). If firms
successfully bring qualification demand into line with supply, this should pay off
in a better performance.
In this paper, we address the question of how the reallocation of R&D workers
affects future innovation activities of firms. Empirical evidence on the dynamics
of worker flows of R&D personnel and its influence on a firm’s innovation perfor-
mance is scarce. Prior studies look a the effect of new R&D workers or net R&D
employment gains. We contribute to the literature in three ways: First, we em-
ploy churning of R&D personnel as an indicator for R&D worker flows. Churning
is a well-established concept in labor economics. The main advantage is that it
abstracts from net employment gains or losses and only measures the number
of workers replaced by new ones, i.e. it depicts an employment-neutral measure
of labor turnover. This feature allows us to separately identify the effect of re-
placement and net change in the R&D workforce on innovation in the empirical
analysis. As a second novel aspect, we investigate whether the effect of labor mo-
bility differs according to the type of innovation. That is, we distinguish between
product and process innovation in a first step and then furthermore discriminate
between different types of product innovations (market novelties, product-range
novelties). We suppose that churning is more beneficial for innovations with a
higher degree of novelty for the firm, i.e. if more external knowledge is required.
Finally, we test the hypothesis that the role of churning on innovation depends
on whether the knowledge which is transferred through mobility can be used by
both the donor and the recipient firm simultaneously afterwards.
The answer to the question of how innovation is influenced by worker mobility
is naturally interesting from a management perspective. If churning lowers inno-
vation performance in the future, firms should for instance consider implement-
ing stronger mechanism to protect their knowledge and setting better incentive
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schemes for R&D workers to stay within the firm. It is likewise interesting from a
policy point of view. If churning exerts a positive impact on innovation through
better job-match qualities and the diffusion of knowledge, loosening up strong
dismissal protection may be a route to foster innovation.
To answer our research question, we estimate two knowledge production func-
tions using bivariate probit models (Pakes and Griliches, 1984). The empirical
analysis is based on a sample of about 1,500 German firms collected within the
Community Innovation Surveys (CIS). In contrast to Kaiser et al. (2008) who find
a positive net effect of labor mobility - as measured by the sum of the contributions
of R&D workers joining and leaving the firm, respectively - on patenting activity,
our results point toward a non-linear inverse u-shaped relationship. Churning of
R&D personnel increases the probability of successfully implementing innovations
up to a specific point. If, however, the exchange of R&D workers exceeds this
threshold, the effect of churning becomes negative. This implies that the firm
cannot compensate the erosion of the existing knowledge base by the inflow of
new knowledge. We furthermore provide evidence that the impact of churning
differs according to the type of innovation.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sketches the main theoretical
arguments of how churning may affect innovation performance at the firm level.
Furthermore, it summarizes the scarce empirical evidence on the effect of labor
mobility on innovation. Section 3 presents our empirical analysis: The data set is
explored in subsection 3.1, followed by the description of the variables and estima-
tion strategy in subsection 3.2. Subsection 3.3 sets forth the econometric results.
Section 4 summarizes our main findings and discusses management implications.
2 Mobility of R&D personnel and innovative
output
A firm’s R&D knowledge is primarily embodied in persons which implies that
firms are not fully able to exercise property rights over their R&D knowledge.
Therefore, R&D workers can potentially profit from their knowledge through job
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mobility. In this respect, traditional reasoning assumes that high worker flows
result in lower appropriability of workers’ knowledge, less incentives to innovate,
and an under-investment in R&D and training. Kim and Marschke (2005) develop
a model in which the risk that a rival firm imitates a firm’s new products after a
scientist’s departure can be mitigated by patenting. They show theoretically and
empirically that the risk of a scientist’s departure both reduces R&D expenditures
and raises the probability of patenting.
However, the presence of large job-flows within highly innovative clusters (Fal-
lick et al., 2006) has encouraged researchers to study the effect of labor mobility
on cluster development. These studies have shown the importance of labor mo-
bility for the success of clusters like Silicon Valley and other high-tech clusters
(Saxenian, 1994; Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Fallick et al., 2006).
Driven by this “job hopping” phenomenon observed in technology clusters,
Cooper (2001) developed a theoretical model of job mobility which serves as a
vehicle for intra-industry knowledge diffusion. Unlike traditional reasoning, his
model predicts that a higher mobility does not necessarily reduce firms’ R&D
investments and always coincides with greater overall technological progress of a
firm. The reasoning behind that is that knowledge dissemination is facilitated
by worker mobility. Cooper’s model assumes that a firm retains a benefit of a
worker’s knowledge and information generated during the employment spell at
the respective firm even after the employee has left to a competitor. The model
stresses the duplicative nature of R&D knowledge. That means, R&D knowledge
is partly non-rivalrous and can by utilized by more than one firm simultaneously.
Therefore, a firm invests in training and R&D even when it has to expect intense
movements of employees.
From this reasoning, one can expect that inter-firm mobility of R&D personnel
increases the innovative abilities of firms by increasing the stock of appropriable
knowledge which can be claimed to be a fundamental innovation input. Since
many econometric studies have shown that innovation input significantly deter-
mines innovation output (see e.g. Cre´pon et al., 1998; Love and Roper, 2001),
we expect inter-firm mobility of R&D personnel to result in higher innovative
performance.
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Another line of reasoning why the mobility of R&D personnel is linked to
innovative output stems from the fact that both worker and employer are faced
with incomplete information in job matching. Before a person is hired the firm has
incomplete information on a workers abilities and skills. Additionally, the worker
has limited information about the tasks he is expected to perform. However, the
tasks a certain job requires should match a workers abilities and skills in order to
maximize the worker’s productivity. The optimal allocation of workers to jobs is
thus a central problem. Assigning the right worker to a specific job is crucial for
both the firm, which aims to maximize profits, and the employee, who wants to
maximize earnings.
The importance of job match quality is highlighted in theoretical (Jovanovic,
1979) and empirical models (Liu, 1986; Topel and Ward, 1992) of job matching
and labor turnover. In these models, a job match is assumed to be an experience
good (Jovanovic, 1979), i.e. the quality of a job match can only be determined
by “experiencing” it after the job match has been formed. The firm can only
learn about the quality of the job match by observing the worker on the job for a
period of time (Topel and Ward, 1992). After new information is obtained about
the worker’s productivity on a specific job, a reassignment of employer-employee
matches may become optimal. While matches of sufficiently high quality are
sustained, a job match is dissolved if the worker’s job specific productivity is
revealed to be relatively low, i.e. if the job match is of poor quality. Thus,
labor turnover is the result of searching for matches of higher quality when better
information about the match quality is accumulated over time. Accordingly, labor
mobility may improve the match quality between the firm and the employee. As
a result, labor productivity is enhanced. This reasoning is in line with the results
of Pakes and Nitzan (1983) who develop a model of optimum labor contracts
for research personnel. They find that labor mobility does not harm an R&D
projects profitability as long as firms can freely choose among alternative labor
contracts. In this case, a firm can set up an incentive scheme which induces a
scientist only to leave if it is in the firm’s interest for the scientist to do so.
A good match is of particular importance when searching for highly-productive
R&D workers. The ideas, abilities, and skills of R&D workers have to fit both
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into the business activities of a firm and into the research team they are assigned
to.
The equilibrium result of workers’ self-selection out of poor quality matches
in the theoretical model of Jovanovic (1979) requires either a sufficient wage flex-
ibility or a limited amount of dismissal protection regulations. However, the
labor market in Germany is characterized by strong unions and intense dismissal
protection. One can thus expect that it is either not possible or rather costly to
dissolve a match of poor quality. Furthermore, firms may be faced with an intense
shortage of labor supply of highly qualified and highly specialized researchers.
One possibility of describing and measuring labor mobility within a firm is the
concept of churning. Churning, also called excess labor reallocation, arises when
a firm simultaneously experiences separations and hires. It measures the amount
of workers which are successfully replaced by other workers.2 This measure was
developed and introduced by labor economists who wanted to describe and ex-
plain employment dynamics within sectors and within firms (Lane et al., 1996;
Burgess et al., 2000a,b, 2001). Churning is an employment-neutral measure of
labor turnover, i.e. the measure abstracts from net employment gains or losses
and only measures the number of replaced workers. A low amount of churning
might characterize firms which are either not able to dissolve job matches of poor
quality or which are able to dissolve poor matches but do not succeed in forming
new matches. According to this line of reasoning a low amount of churning means
to suffer from retaining poor matches. Therefore, a positive effect of churning on
innovation output can be supposed.
On the other hand, if the amount of churning is very high, e.g. if a firm re-
places almost all its R&D workers, the firm’s knowledge stock will be eroded.
What is more, hiring new workers can cause sizeable transaction costs. The firm
has to look for new R&D workers and sometimes the firm might not manage
to hire new workers reasonably soon. Furthermore, new workers need to be in-
structed. Instruction and training of new workers raises costs, especially when
a large amount of time of the experienced R&D workers is needed to train new
R&D personnel properly. Therefore, the effects of churning on innovation are
2The churning measure is explained in detail in section 3.2
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expected to be negative if the amount of churning exceeds a certain threshold.
All together, the relationship between churning and innovation is expected to be
inverse u-shaped (which was also assumed by Ettlie, 1985).
The importance of labor mobility for technological performance is highlighted
by the results of a couple of empirical studies. These studies can be classified
into three groups according to their level of analysis. In addition to the cluster
or regional level (see Saxenian, 1994), researchers examined this question at the
level of the firm and the individual worker, respectively.
At the individual level, empirical evidence is mixed. Hoisl (2007) tracks mobile
inventors using official data from patent files. She finds mobile inventors to be
more productive in terms of patent applications than non-movers. In contrast to
the findings of Hoisl (2007) for German inventors, Aoshima (2008) does not find
a positive effect on the innovative behavior of semiconductor engineers in Japan.
He even finds a negative effect of the number of inter-organizational and intra-
organizational transfers on an engineer’s technological performance as measured
by the number of patents and the number of published papers.
Rao and Drazin (2002) tested several hypothesis concerning the recruitment
of new personnel and product innovation using a sample of mutual fund families.
They expected that the recruitment of talents from rivals helps to overcome re-
source constraints on product innovation, e.g. poor connectedness in case of the
mutual funds industry. Analyzing the recruiting and innovation behavior of these
funds, they find that the number of stock portfolio manager recruits has a positive
influence on the probability of introducing a product innovation. Furthermore,
recruits’ characteristics are found to increase product innovations.
Ettlie (1985) conducted correlation analyses in order to test several hypotheses
concerning net manpower flows and innovation outcomes developed in earlier work
(Ettlie, 1980). Using information about 56 food processing firms, he finds that
net gain manpower flows stimulate radical process innovation outcomes but tend
to be inversely related to other innovation outcomes, i.e. incremental process
innovation and the number of new products. But in order to gain from the “new
blood”, the integration of newcomers has to be managed effectively. Based on the
reasoning of Price (1977), who emphasizes both a positive effect of “new blood”
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on innovation and a negative, disruptive force of turnover, Ettlie (1985) stated
the hypothesis of a curvilinear relationship between turnover and innovation, but
his findings do not give a clear indication of a curvilinear relationship.3
Whereas Rao and Drazin (2002) and Ettlie (1985) merely investigated the
effects of new personnel and net gains of personnel, respectively, Kaiser et al.
(2008) provide the only study which also accounts for the effect of leaving work-
ers. They conducted a firm-level study using a linked-employer employee data
set. Their evidence points towards a positive (negative) impact of R&D workers
joining (leaving) a firm on patenting activity. The net effect of labor mobility
as measured by the sum of contributions is positive. They furthermore find that
the mobility of R&D workers increases both the patent activity of the donor (the
firms which experience the leave of R&D workers) and recipient (the firms which
get new R&D workers) firms. However, none of the empirical investigations so far
studies the effect of employment neutral mobility of R&D personnel, i.e. churning,
on product innovation.
Analyzing the effects of overall employment dynamics at the firm level, Il-
makunnas et al. (2005) find empirical evidence for Jovanovic’s (1979) job match-
ing argument. Using ordinary least square regressions they find that churning of
employees has a significant positive effect on total factor productivity growth.
To sum up, the empirical literature has yet not used the churning measure
to address our research question. Churning is a highly informative measures of
employment dynamics and its use allows to disentangle the effect of replacement
from net change in R&D workforce. Furthermore, most studies focus on patent
activities. There is no empirical information on how churning effects different
types of innovation. Finally, R&D knowledge was not distinguished by its ap-
propriability regime. With the present empirical analysis, we try to bridge this
gap.
Based on the theoretical arguments mentioned above, we will test the following
three hypotheses concerning the flows of R&D workers and innovative outcomes
in the empirical analysis:
3Note that this result is based on a cross-tabulation of the two variables. Ettlie (1985) does
not provide a formal test for the hypothesis.
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Hypothesis 1: The probability of successfully implementing innovations in-
creases with gains in R&D personnel.
Hypothesis 2: Churning of R&D personnel is positively related to the proba-
bility of successfully implementing innovations up to a specific point. Beyond this
point an increase in churning of R&D personnel lowers the propensity to innovate
(inverse u-shaped relationship).
Besides the conjecture of an increased productivity of R&D workers due to
dissolving poor matches, Hypothesis 2 considerably relies on Cooper’s (2001)
assumption of a duplicative nature of R&D knowledge. The extent to which
R&D knowledge can be simultaneously used by firms largely depends on how
effectively knowledge can be protected and hence appropriated. Positive effects
of the churning of R&D personnel might therefore be (partly) offset if the R&D
knowledge of a firm is non-duplicative.
Hypothesis 3: If R&D knowledge is non-duplicative, the positive impact of
churning of R&D personnel on successfully implementing innovations is lower.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 The data
The empirical analysis employs data from the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP).
The MIP is an annual innovation survey conducted by the Centre for European
Economic Research (ZEW), the Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation
Research (ISI), and the Institute for Applied Social Sciences (infas) on behalf of
the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF). The target
population consists of all firms located in Germany having at least 5 employees in
manufacturing, mining, energy, and selected service sectors. The survey is drawn
as a stratified random sample and is representative of the corresponding target
population.4 The survey methodology and definitions of innovation indicators
4The stratification criteria are firm size (8 and 7 size classes according to the number of em-
ployees in manufacturing and services, respectively), industry (at the two-digit level according
to the NACE Rev.1 classification system with the exception of NACE 22, 24, 64 and 74 where
9
are strongly related to the recommendations on innovation surveys set out in the
Oslo Manual (see OECD and Eurostat (2005); first published in 1992), thereby
yielding internationally comparable data on the innovation activities of German
firms. The MIP is the German contribution to the Europe-wide harmonized
Community Innovation Surveys (CIS) which take place every 4 year and since
2005 every second year.
To test the hypotheses about the impact of churning on firms’ innovation
performance, we use three survey waves. The 2006 survey provides detailed in-
formation about the mobility of R&D personnel. Our dependent variables, i.e.
different measures of innovation performance, are taken from the 2008 survey.
Hence, we explain the effect of churning on future innovation performance to re-
duce potential endogeneity problems. To test hypothesis 3, we use information
about firms’ knowledge protection strategies. This information comes from the
2005 survey, as no such information is contained in the 2006 survey. The net sam-
ples in 2005, 2006 and 2008 consists of 5,563, 5,187 and 6,624 firms, respectively.
Though the surveys are designed as a panel, merging data from three survey
waves leads to a considerable reduction in the number of observations since par-
ticipation is voluntary. For estimation purposes, we further exclude firms with
incomplete data for any of the relevant variables (which are discussed in section
3.2), ending up with a sample of 1,576 firms.
3.2 Variables and method
This section describes the variables we use in the empirical analysis and the
econometric method we apply. A summarizing table of all variables included in
the analysis can be found in Table 1. The respective descriptive statistics are
given in Table 2. Most of the explanatory variables are included using lagged
values.
a 3-digit level is employed) and region (East and West Germany). A detailed description of the
data is given in Peters (2008).
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Measuring innovation
For measuring innovation performance, we employ four different binary indicators.
Similar to Ettlie (1985), we distinguish between product and process innovation
in a first step. According to the Oslo Manual, product or process innovators are
firms which successfully introduced a new product or process within the previous
3 years, respectively. A product innovation is defined as a new or significantly
improved product or service which is brought onto the market by the firm. A pro-
cess innovation is a new or significantly improved production technology, delivery
or distribution method, including methods to provide services, introduced by the
firm. Concerning product innovations, we further distinguish between market
novelties and product-range novelties in a second step. While market novelties
are product innovations that a firm has introduced onto the market prior to any
competitor, product-range novelties are product innovations that open up a new
product range within the firm, i.e. new products with no predecessors in the
innovating firm. Note that market novelties are not necessarily product-range
novelties and vice versa. Overall, one third of the firms in our estimation sample
have introduced at least one product innovation between 2005 and 2007. One
fourth has introduced process innovations within that time. A fraction of 15 per-
cent introduced products which were new to the market and 20 percent of all
firms in the estimation sample have introduced product-range novelties.
Measuring flows of R&D workers
Employment fluctuations within a firm can be measured using various indicators.
Common measures are the number of hirings or the number of separations over
total employment (hiring and separation rates). Often the turnover rate (sum of
hirings and separations over total employment) is used when analyzing worker
flows. More recent studies have introduced a concept called “churning” or “excess
worker reallocation”, which describes the amount of workers replaced by new
ones (e.g. Lane et al., 1996; Burgess et al., 2001; Ilmakunnas et al., 2005). If 3
employees leave a firm during a specific period and the firm hires 5 new employees
during that period, a firm has a churning of 3 workers and a net gain of 2
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employees. If another firm records 5 separation during that time and hires 3
new employees, this firm has also a churning of 3 workers, but a net loss of
2 employees. Both firms have the same amount of churning, but they differ
with respect to their employment growth. Because of this property, the churning
measure is often interpreted as “excess worker reallocation”. Churning measures
the amount of employment fluctuations which exceeds the amount of hirings or
separations necessary for a change in total employment. Therefore, the measure
abstracts from changes in total employment. We calculate the amount of churning
of R&D workers in firm i as follows:
Ci =
1
2
(Hi + Si − |Hi − Si|) ,
where Hi is the number of newly hired R&D workers between 2003 and 2005
and Si denotes the number of R&D workers who left the firm between 2003 and
2005. Though our hypotheses state that labor mobility affects innovation, we
cannot rule out inverse causality, i.e. that innovation is initiated which requires
and attracts new personnel (Ettlie, 1985). Due to data constraints, we cannot test
for causality. To alleviate potential endogeneity problems of our main variable,
we include a lagged measure of churning. The distribution of churning is highly
skewed with an average churning in our estimation sample of 3.1 R&D workers.
Hence, we estimated the model using the churning rate CRi =
Ci
Ni
, with Ni
measuring the average number of R&D workers in 2005. On average 2.7 percent
of the R&D personnel was successfully replaced.
In order to test hypothesis 2, we include the churning rate as well as a squared
term of the churning rate in our regressions since the relationship between churn-
ing and innovation might be inverse u-shaped as supposed by Ettlie (1985).
We further calculated the growth rate of R&D employment to account for
(positive or negative) net gains in R&D personnel. On average, R&D employ-
ment has increased by 2.4 percent. If hypothesis 1 is true, we should observe a
positive relationship between the growth of R&D employment and the probability
of introducing an innovation.
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Table 1: Description of variables
Variable Description Source
Product innovation New or significantly improved products
and/or services with respect to technological
characteristics or intended uses, which are
brought onto the market by the firm in
2005-2007
MIP 2008
Process innovation New or significantly improved production,
delivery or distribution methods, including
methods to provide services, introduced by
the firm in 2005-2007
MIP 2008
Market novelties Product innovations that a firm has
introduced onto the market prior to any
competitor in 2005-2007
MIP 2008
Product-range nov. Product innovation in 2005-2007 that have
no predecessors in the innovating firms
MIP 2008
Churning rate (CR) Churning 2003-2005R&D personnel (average in 2005) × 100 MIP 2006
Churning (C) Churning between 2003 and 2005 (level) MIP 2006
Non-duplicative knowledge Indicator for non-duplicative knowledge
within the firm: Firm declares the use of
secrecy to be highly important for knowledge
protection.
MIP 2005
R&D Personnel (growth) Growth of R&D personnel from 2003 to 2005 MIP 2006
R&D personnel (level) Average number of R&D workers (2005) MIP 2006
Log(employees) Logarithm of the number of firm’s non R&D
employees (average in 2005)
MIP 2006
Share of high-skilled empl. Share of employees with a university or
college degree in 2005
MIP 2006
Export intensity ExportsTurnover in 2005 MIP 2006
Log(labor productivity) Logarithm of firm’s labor productivity(
Turnover (in thousand EUR)
# employees
)
in 2005
MIP 2006
Log(age) Logarithm of firm’s age in 2007 Creditreform
Eastern Germany Firm is located in eastern Germany Creditreform
Limited Liability Legal form results in limited liability of the
firm’s owners
Creditreform
Other manufacturing Other manufacturing (OECD definition) MIP 2008
Low-tech manuf. Low-technology manufacturing (OECD
definition)
MIP 2008
Medium-tech manuf. Medium-technology manufacturing (OECD
definition)
MIP 2008
High-tech manuf. High-technology manufacturing (OECD
definition)
MIP 2008
Knowledge-int. services Knowledge-intensive services (OECD
definition)
MIP 2008
Low knowl.-int. services Low knowledge-intensive services (OECD
definition)
MIP 2008
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent variables
Product innovation 0.337 0.473 0 1
Process innovation 0.266 0.442 0 1
Market novelties 0.152 0.359 0 1
Product-range nov. 0.198 0.399 0 1
Independent variables
Churning rate (CR)a) 2.659 10.500 0 150
Churning level (C) 3.099 37.833 0 1098
Non-duplicative knowledge 0.177 0.382 0 1
R&D Personnel (growth) 2.391 16.267 -100 150
R&D personnel (level) 20.542 176.792 0 3753.75
Log(employees) 3.729 1.930 -13.816 11.345
Share of high-skilled empl. 19.584 23.755 0 100
Export intensity 12.624 22.359 0 100
Log(labor productivity) -1.490 0.900 -4.674 3.069
Log(age) 2.810 0.744 0 5.541
Eastern Germany 0.380 0.486 0 1
Limited Liability 0.841 0.366 0 1
Industry1
Other manufacturing 0.077 0.266 0 1
Low-tech manuf. 0.153 0.360 0 1
Medium-tech manuf. 0.266 0.442 0 1
High-tech manuf. 0.063 0.243 0 1
Knowledge-int. services 0.289 0.453 0 1
Low knowl.-int. services 0.152 0.359 0 1
Note: a) CR is not bounded at 100. For example, if a firm has 3 R&D workers initially, 2 hirings
and 4 separations within the period 2003-2005, then the churning rate amounts to 2
1
× 100 = 200.
Source: MIP 2005, 2006, 2008, authors’ calculations.
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Hypothesis 3 is tested using information about the importance of different
knowledge protection measures. The method most often used to protect knowl-
edge is secrecy. If a firm stated that it uses secrecy as a measure of knowledge
protection and classifies the use of secrecy as highly important, we question the
duplicative nature of this firm’s R&D knowledge. Assuming a duplicative na-
ture of a firm’s R&D knowledge implies that a firm can use the knowledge an
R&D worker has produced even if the respective worker has left the firm. If a
firm assigns secrecy as highly important, a firm fears to loose at least parts of
this knowledge. In this case, the R&D knowledge of the firm is non-duplicative.
Overall, 17.7 percent of the firms in our sample can be characterized by a non-
duplicative nature of their R&D knowledge. We included the dummy variable
non-duplicative knowledge in the regressions and investigate if the supposed posi-
tive effects of churning on innovation cancel out by including an interaction effect
of that dummy and the churning measure.
Control variables
We control for a set of additional firm characteristics which have been shown to
be related to innovation performance of firms in previous studies (Acs and Au-
dretsch, 1988; Bhattacharya and Bloch, 2004). Specifically, we control for size
effects as measured by the total number of non-R&D workers (log(employees))
and innovation input proxied by the level of R&D personnel. We further account
for innovative capabilities by including the share of high-skilled employees. The
effect of international activities on innovation (Almeida and Fernandes, 2006) is
captured by incorporating the export intensity. Finally, differences in overall labor
productivity (log(labor productivity)), firm age (Huergo and Jaumandreu, 2004),
regional location (Eastern Germany), and the legal form through liability differ-
ences (limited liability) may affect innovation (Ayygari et al., 2007). With respect
to industry differences, we distinguish six industries concerning their global tech-
nological intensity as proposed by the OECD. The category other manufacturing
serves as reference category in the estimations.
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Estimation strategy
Since we suppose that the decision to introduce product and process innovations is
not independently determined, we apply bivariate probit estimations. In a second
step, we identify the effect of churning on different types of product innovations,
namely market novelties and product-range novelties. The bivariate probit is
a natural extension of the probit model which, similar to seemingly unrelated
regression models, allows for two equations with correlated disturbances ε1 and
ε2 (Greene, 2003). We estimate two sets of bivariate probit regression models
described by
y∗1 = x
′
β1 + ε1, y1 = 1 if y
∗
1 > 0, y1 = 0 otherwise
y∗2 = x
′
β2 + ε2, y2 = 1 if y
∗
2 > 0, y2 = 0 otherwise
E(ε1|x) = E(ε2|x) = 0
V ar(ε1|x) = V ar(ε2|x) = 1
Cov(ε1, ε1|x) = ρ.
The dependent variables are denoted by y1 and y2 with their unobserved latent
variables y∗1 and y
∗
2, x is the vector of independent variables, and β is the vector
of coefficients to be estimated.
3.3 Estimation results
Results of the bivariate probit regressions are presented in Table 3 for product
and process innovations and in Table 4 for market novelties and product-range
novelties. First, the model was estimated without the interaction of the dummy
variable non-duplicative knowledge (Models 1) and afterwards firms were distin-
guished by the nature of their R&D knowledge (Models 2).
In all models we observe a significant positive influence of the growth rate of
R&D personnel on the probability to innovate. This confirms hypothesis 1.
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The results further show that the churning rate (CR) has a significant in-
fluence on both product and process innovations. Since the coefficient estimate
of the square term is significantly negative, the relationship between churning
of R&D personnel and innovation outcomes is to found to be inverse u-shaped.
This finding is in favor of hypothesis 2. The same is true for market novelties and
product-range novelties.
For all types of innovations except of process innovations, the effect is robust
to introducing the variables which distinguish firms by the nature of their R&D
knowledge. Firms which declare the use of secrecy to be highly important for
knowledge protection have a higher probability to introduce product innovations
and process innovations. This effect is not surprising since by construction the
dummy non-duplicative nature may also indicate that the firm has accumulated
a large stock of knowledge which has to be protected and which serves as base
for further innovation activities in the future.
Distinguished by the nature of their knowledge using the indicator variable
non-duplicative knowledge, churning exhibits a different influence on the probabil-
ity to innovate. The coefficients on the churning rate, the square of the churning
rate, the non-duplicative knowledge dummy, and the interaction effect are jointly
significant at the 1 percent level in all models.
Interestingly, the effect of churning on the probability to introduce product
innovations peaks at a churning rate of 65 percent whereas the peak for process
innovations lies at 30 percent (see Figure 1a and Figure 1c). That is, the optimal
amount of churning among R&D workers is larger for product innovations than
for process innovations. This result can be explained by the fact that much more
firm-specific knowledge is needed for significantly improving production processes
within a firm than for developing new products. Hence, the disruptive effect of
churning starts earlier for process innovation. For firms with non-duplicative
R&D knowledge, the probability to introduce product innovations peaks at a
churning rate of 45 percent. If R&D knowledge is duplicative, the effect peaks at
a churning rate of 70 percent (see Figure 1b). Firms with non-duplicative R&D
knowledge have a higher probability of introducing product innovations than firms
with duplicative R&D knowledge as long as the churning rate is below 50 percent.
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This result is in line with hypothesis 3 since it indicates that the positive effect
of churning is partly offset for firms where the knowledge is non-duplicative.
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
Pr
ob
 (p
rod
uc
t in
no
va
tio
n=
1)
0 50 100 150
Churning rate
(a) Product innov. - model 1a
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
Pr
ob
 (p
rod
uc
t in
no
va
tio
n=
1)
0 50 100 150
Churning rate
Non−dupl. knowl.= 0 Non−dupl. knowl.= 1
(b) Product innov. - model 2a
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
Pr
ob
 (p
roc
es
s i
nn
ov
ati
on
=1
)
0 50 100 150
Churning rate
(c) Process innov. - model 1a
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
Pr
ob
 (p
roc
es
s i
nn
ov
ati
on
=1
)
0 50 100 150
Churning rate
Non−dupl. knowl.= 0 Non−dupl. knowl.= 1
(d) Process innov. - model 2a
Figure 1: Churning and the probability of product and process innovations
Note: Average predictions. Model 1a does not account for the interaction of non-duplicative
knowledge and churning (left side) while model 2a does (right side).
Source: MIP 2005, 2006, 2008, author’s calculations.
Since the interaction effect for process innovations is small and far beyond
significance, the effect of churning on the probability to introduce process innova-
tions peaks regardless the nature of knowledge at around 25 percent (see Figure
1d). Thus, hypothesis 3 cannot be confirmed for process innovation.
Concerning market novelties, we estimate a point of inflexion of 65 percent,
while the probability to introduce product-range novelties peaks at a churning
rate of 85 percent (Figure 2a and Figure 2c). Compared to findings of Ettlie
(1985) this result may be surprising at first glance. It says that the reallocation
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of R&D workers is more likely to stimulate the introduction of new products
which were outside the existing product-range than of market novelties. But note
that firms can launch market novelties within their existing product range where
they already have shown expertise. Introducing new products for which there are
no predecessors in the firm, however, obviously requires more external knowledge
which can be gained through labor mobility.
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Figure 2: Churning and the probability of market and product-range novelties
Note: Average predictions. Model 1b does not account for the interaction of non-duplicative
knowledge and churning (left side) while model 2b does (right side).
Source: MIP 2005, 2006, 2008, author’s calculations.
Figure 2b and Figure 2d display the effect of churning on the probability to
introduce market novelties and product-range novelties distinguished by the na-
ture of R&D knowledge. The effect on market novelties (product-range novelties)
peaks at 25 percent (55 percent) if R&D knowledge is non-duplicative and at 75
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percent (95 percent) if R&D knowledge can be assumed to be duplicative. The
probability to introduce market novelties (product-range novelties) is higher for
firms having accumulated non-duplicative knowledge as long as the churning rate
is below 45 percent (65 percent).
The control variables show the expected signs. Size (log(employees)) is found
to exert a positive effect on innovation. Also, innovation inputs are found to be
positively related to innovation outcomes. But the coefficient for the number of a
company’s R&D workers is not significantly different from zero for product inno-
vations in general. The share of high-skilled employees positively influences the
probability to innovate in all models and all equations. Exporting is only found to
be positively correlated to product innovation. Overall labor productivity turns
out to be positively related to innovation except for product-range novelties. The
industry dummies are jointly significant in all models and all equations.
4 Conclusions
This paper has investigated the consequences of R&D worker mobility on inno-
vation performance at the firm level. We contribute to the literature of inventor
mobility and innovation success by conducting an analysis at the firm level which
first adopts a measure of labor mobility developed in labor economics: the churn-
ing of R&D personnel.
In developing our hypothesis, we refer to the theories of Jovanovic (1979)
and Cooper (2001). According to these theories, labor mobility increases the
employer-employee matching quality within the R&D department (Jovanovic,
1979). Furthermore, labor mobility results in net inflows of R&D knowledge
(Cooper, 2001). However, if churning of R&D personnel is very high, costs may
exceed the benefits and the relationship between churning and innovation is more
likely to be inverse u-shaped. In our empirical analysis, we first distinguished be-
tween product and process innovation. In a second step, we further distinguished
between product-range novelties and market novelties. We employed bivariate
probit estimations. Our hypothesis of an inversed u-shaped relationship between
churning and innovation can be confirmed for various kinds of innovation output
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measures. Interestingly, the point beyond which an increase in churning of R&D
personnel lowers the propensity to innovate differs between the different types of
innovation. However, the point beyond which an increase in churning of R&D
personnel lowers the propensity to innovate is very high except for process inno-
vations. We conclude from these findings that process innovations require much
more firm-specific knowledge than product innovations. This applies particularly
to firms with duplicative R&D knowledge. Mostly, the returns to churning are
found to be positive even when more than half of the researchers are replaced.
Especially product-range innovations are found to largely benefit from inflows of
external knowledge by means of R&D worker mobility. If a firm’s R&D knowl-
edge is non-duplicative, as measured by the importance of secrecy as a knowledge
protection mechanism, positive effects of churning on innovation performance are
found to be partly offset in case of product innovations. The point when costs
of churning exceed the benefits is reached faster if the R&D knowledge is not
duplicative than if the R&D knowledge is duplicative.
The results of our study have several implications for innovation management.
First, innovation performance may be impeded by statical personnel structure
within R&D departments. More dynamics are required in order to get access to
new knowledge and to dissolve poor employee matches. Therefore, a firm should
maintain a moderate level of churning among its R&D workers. However, a firm
should take care that its churning does not exceed a certain threshold. Accord-
ingly, labor agreements should be sufficient flexible on both sides. The period
of notice should be reasonable in order not to hamper R&D workers’ mobility
and to hinder knowledge flows. Furthermore, the use of non-compete clauses is
disadvantageous for both employer and employee if a firm’s R&D knowledge is
duplicative. Firms might even profit from delegating an R&D worker to a com-
petitor for a specific project or a certain period of time. Moreover, firms might
even think about retracting R&D workers who have left the firm a while ago in
order to benefit from the knowledge this worker has gained working for the other
firm.
One the other hand, policy makers should be aware that an increase in labor
market flexibility (e.g. dismissal protection) does not only affect labor market
outcomes but may also be an additional route to foster innovation by encourag-
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ing improvements in the job-match qualities and by facilitating the diffusion of
knowledge.
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